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This paper assesses governmental performance in its investment, provision and regulation of urban 
transportation. Attention is given to public bus and rail transit and road transportation. Evidence 
based on urban transport in US cities reveals substantial allocative and technical inefficiencies that 
have led to large public transit deficits and severe highway congestion. 
I argue that it is futile to expect public officials to remedy the situation by pursuing more 
efficient policies such as congestion pricing and weighing costs and benefits when deciding transit 
service. The problem is that urban transportation policy is largely shaped by entrenched political 
forces that inhibit constructive change. The only realistic way to improve the system is to shield it 
from those influences and expose it to market forces by privatising it. This position is supported by 
empirical evidence based on simulations for the US and the UK’s early experience with 
privatisation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public provision of urban transportation is, in theory, socially desirable. Rail and 
bus operations exhibit economies of traffic density that could lead to destructive 
competition in an unregulated market. Highways are traditionally perceived as 
public goods that require enormous capital and maintenance investments that the 
private sector is unlikely to finance. Improving the urban mobility of elderly and 
low-income citizens is an important social goal that should be addressed by 
government. But in their official capacity as regulators, service providers and 
investors, public officials have generally instituted policies that have led to 
inefficient and inequitable urban transportation. A case for privatising urban 
transport is developing because these actual government failures most likely 
outweigh potential market failures. 
Governmental involvement in the transportation systems of US cities 
illustrates the problem. Local governments, with state and federal financial 
support, are quasi-monopoly providers of urban bus and rail transit. Most US 
roads and bridges are owned and operated by federal, state or local governments. 
How has the public system performed? City roads are jammed at an ever 
expanding rush hour, causing infuriating delays. Bus service, never fast, has 
deteriorated over the years, while fares have risen. Pressures to expand rail 
service to outlying suburbs remain strong, even though current rail operations 
cannot attract enough riders to cover more than a small fraction of their total 
expenses including capital costs. 
Popular opinion seems to be that the US can — and should — spend its way 
out of this mess by building more roads, running more buses and installing more 
track. Indeed, in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21
st Century, T21 for 
short, Congress greatly increased federal support for transit and highways for 
1998–2003. Many transportation analysts are sceptical and argue that, although 
more public spending for urban transport may result in some improvements for 
travellers, its primary effects will be to swell transportation deficits and waste 
tax revenues. Instead, they suggest that government pursue more ‘efficient’ 
policies such as charging motorists for the congestion they cause and balancing 
costs and benefits when deciding transit frequencies, route coverage and vehicle 
sizes. 
I have come to believe that it is futile to expect public officials to consider 
such changes because urban transportation policy is largely shaped by 
entrenched political forces. The forces that have led to inefficient prices and 
service, excessive labour costs, bloated bureaucracies and construction-cost 
overruns promise more of the same for the future. The only realistic way to 
improve the system is to shield it from those influences and expose it to market 
forces by privatising it. Preliminary evidence from the UK and elsewhere 
suggests that, although a private urban transportation sector should not be 
expected to perform flawlessly, it could eliminate most government failures and Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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allow innovation and state-of-the-art technology to flourish free of government 
interference. The real uncertainty is what could spur policymakers to initiate 
change. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE US URBAN TRANSIT SYSTEM 
The US government began subsidising urban transportation in the 1950s, funding 
urban extensions of the interstate highway system. Then, in response both to the 
deteriorating financial condition of private transit — an issue to which I will 
return — and to arguments by big-city mayors that subsidising transit would be 
more cost-effective than building highways, Congress passed legislation in the 
early 1960s that helped cities buy their transit companies. Federal operating 
subsidies followed in the 1970s. Today, most operating assistance comes from 
state and local governments, while Washington shoulders most capital 
investment. 
Growing federal support of mass transit slowed the long-run decline in the 
use of buses and light-rail systems — trolleys and streetcars (Figure 1). By the  
 
FIGURE 1 
Heavy- and Light-Rail and Motor-Bus Vehicle-Miles
a 
aA number of smaller and rural systems are excluded before 1984. 
Sources: American Public Transit Association – 1997 Transit Fact Book (for 1984–95), 1991 Transit Fact 
Book (for 1975–83), 1974–75 Transit Fact Book (for 1960–73), 1981 Transit Fact Book (for 1974) and 
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TABLE 1 
Journey-to-Work Passengers and Mode Shares in US Urban Areas with Population 
Greater than 1 Million 
Mode  1960 1970 1980 1990 
Millions of workers      
Privately owned vehicle  17.5  27.6  36.5  49.8 
Bus  3.8 3.3 3.0 2.9 
Subway / Rail  2.3  2.2  2.0  2.3 
Walk  3.0 2.7 2.1 2.2 
Other  5.2 1.2 1.7 2.4 
Percentage of workers      
Privately owned vehicle  61.0  74.4  80.4  83.5 
Bus  13.1 9.0 6.7 4.9 
Subway / Rail  8.0  5.9  4.5  3.8 
Walk  10.4 7.4 4.7 3.8 
Other  7.5 3.3 3.7 4.0 
Note: The ‘other’ category in 1960 and 1970 passenger trips includes walking, taxi, motorcycle, bicycle and 
respondents who work at home. The ‘other’ category in other years and in mode share includes these modes 
except walking. The mode share data for walking in 1960 and 1970 are based on US data rather than major 
urban area data. The set of major urban areas with population exceeding 1 million changes by decade. 
Sources: Federal Highway Administration, Journey-to-Work Trends in the United States and its Major 
Metropolitan Areas 1960–1990, 1993, from census data; Federal Highway Administration, Journey-to-Work 
Trends, based on 1960, 1970 and 1980 Decennial Censuses, 1986; and author’s calculations. 
 
late 1970s, federal subsidies had expanded bus and heavy-rail capacity.
1 
Capacity has continued to increase in the past two decades, but other trends have 
revealed ominous weaknesses in service (Winston and Shirley, 1998). Many 
cities have cut bus frequency on their core routes to extend service to the 
suburbs. Many others, including New York, Chicago and San Francisco, have 
cut rail-service frequency and raised real fares. Indeed, since 1980, real transit 
fares per passenger-mile have increased 54 per cent.
2 Although federal support 
of public transit was intended to lure urban travellers from their cars, the share of 
commuters who use bus and rail has diminished since the 1960s. Rising incomes 
and suburban sprawl have reinforced commuters’ preferences for their 
automobiles, causing autos’ share of work trips to climb to nearly 84 per cent by 
1990 (Table 1).
3 Between 1960 and 1990, mass transit’s share of all trips in large 
                                                                                                                                    
1It would be preferable to measure bus and rail capacity in terms of seat-miles instead of vehicle-miles. 
Information on seat-miles, however, is only available from the American Public Transit Association since 1980. 
Based on these data, bus and heavy-rail seating capacity has remained relatively constant, while light rail’s 
seating capacity has increased somewhat. Thus using vehicle-miles instead of seat-miles understates the recent 
growth of light-rail capacity but does not have much impact on the growth of bus and heavy-rail capacity. 
2American Public Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, various issues. 
3These mode shares are based on decennial censuses. Mode shares based on the 2000 census are not yet 
available. Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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urban areas, where transit service should be most attractive, fell from more than 
20 per cent to less than 10 per cent.
4 Transit’s high share of empty seats attests to 
its inefficient operations. In the mid-1990s, rail filled roughly 18 per cent of its 
seats with paying customers, buses roughly 14 per cent (Winston and Shirley, 
1998). 
Public transit’s long-run growth in capacity and decline in patronage have 
helped create deficits that are a serious drain on the public purse. By 1997, 
transit operating expenses in the US were about $19 billion a year, almost twice 
the yearly $10.6 billion in operating revenues. Continuing capital investments 
are swelling this deficit (1998 capital subsidies amounted to $7.4  billion).
5 
Government involvement portends better things for special interests than for 
travellers. According to Pickrell (1985) and Lee (1987), as much as 75 per cent 
of federal spending on mass transit ends up in the pockets of transit workers (as 
above-market wages) or goes to suppliers of transit capital equipment (as higher 
profits and interest). Just 25 per cent is used to improve transit and lower fares. 
Although transit use has increased during the current US economic 
expansion, transit’s market share has kept falling.
6 Moreover, according to data 
from the National Transit Database, transit use was lower in 1998 than in 1989. 
None the less, with growing government support for transit, cities will find it 
easier to build new (light) rail systems or extend existing ones, ensuring that 
transit deficits will grow even larger. 
A fundamental problem with rail construction projects is that ridership tends 
to be grossly overestimated at the planning stage, while capital and operating 
costs are underestimated. For example, after breaking ground in 1986, the new 
Los Angeles Red Line (light-rail system) finally opened in June 2000. The 17.4-
mile system, costing more than $4.5 billion, now hopes to lure only 100,000 
riders a day in a county with 10 million residents.
7 The system was originally 
intended to be much larger and carry more passengers, but after years of 
construction delays and cost overruns and faced with cost projections of some 
$75 billion over the next 20 years, Los Angeles voters decided in 1998 to block 
further use of local sales tax revenue for subway construction, effectively 
preventing expansion of the current Red Line. 
                                                                                                                                    
4Passenger counts and mode shares for all types of trips are available from the US Federal Highway 
Administration,  Personal Transportation Survey, Department of Transportation, 1990. Because the sample 
sizes are generally considered small, national estimates derived from these data should be regarded as 
preliminary. None the less, the data reveal trends and magnitudes that are consistent with those based on 
reliable samples of work trips. 
5Operating subsidies are from the American Public Transit Association, 1998 Transit Fact Book, Washington 
DC, and capital subsidies are from the National Transit Administration, National Transit Database, US 
Department of Transportation. 
6Wendell Cox, ‘Report of public transit’s “record” ridership questionable’, June 2000 (available at 
www.heritage.org). 
7Todd S. Purdum, ‘Los Angeles subway reaches end of the line’, New York Times, 23 June 2000, p. 1. Fiscal Studies 
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Public transit authorities face growing financial pressures to maintain rail 
operations as these systems age. For example, the Washington, DC, Metro 
subway system, which began service only in 1976, is struggling with equipment 
breakdowns, such as broken escalators and failed relays, and water seepage that 
is crippling power and communications systems and track infrastructure at an 
alarming rate. When faced with the likelihood that money would not be available 
over the next several years to make all necessary repairs and purchase additional 
equipment, regional planners concluded that far more people will have to drive 
cars than previously projected.
8 
In retrospect, the US public transportation experiment has been a major 
disappointment and done little to stem the growth of automobile travel. 
Policymakers are now confronted with the rising costs of this experiment. 
III. US URBAN HIGHWAYS 
The US has invested hundreds of billions of dollars — primarily from gas taxes 
(i.e. road fuel taxes) — in building and maintaining roads to accommodate auto 
and truck travel, but, like rail transit investments, the cost of some urban road 
projects has turned out to be much greater than anticipated. The most glaring 
example of cost overruns is the so-called Big Dig depression of Boston’s central 
artery, considered to be the largest public works project in US history. Originally 
projected to cost $2.3 billion in 1984, it is now expected to cost $13.6 billion 
when finally completed in 2004, but even that figure could rise.
9 At a smaller 
scale, but indicative of the extent of the problem, transportation officials in the 
Washington, DC, region acknowledge that the cost of replacing a major highway 
interchange known as the ‘Mixing Bowl’ has ballooned from $350 million to 
$509 million and become the region’s most expensive highway project. Officials 
fear costs could run higher and stall other transportation projects.
10 
The motoring public is less knowledgeable about construction cost overruns 
than about the increase in urban automobile congestion. Vehicle-miles travelled 
in urban areas increased 82 per cent from 1980 to 1997, while urban road 
mileage increased only 33 per cent.
11 The share of urban highways with peak-
hour traffic volume exceeding 71 per cent of design capacity — a common 
indicator of congestion — increased steadily during the 1980s to more than 50 
per cent of urban interstate miles and 40 per cent of other freeway miles (Figure 
2).
12 Although workplace and residential adjustments during the 1990s, such as  
 
                                                                                                                                    
8Alan Sipress, ‘Transportation plan reveals funding gap’, Washington Post, 13 July 2000, p. 1. 
9Pamela Ferdinand, ‘Boston’s “Big Dig” buried in cost overruns’, Washington Post, 12 April 2000, p. A3. 
10Alan Sipress, ‘Springfield interchange price tag rises 45%’, Washington Post, 15 June 2000, p. B1. 
11US Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, various years. 
12Measures of congestion after 1994 are based on a change in capacity calculation procedures, which makes it 
difficult to compare congestion in 1995 and years thereafter with that in previous years. Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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FIGURE 2 
Urban Road Miles at Over 71 Per Cent Capacity in Peak Periods 
Source: Table HM-61, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, Department of Transportation, 
various years. 
 
working and living in outlying suburbs, have helped stabilise urban congestion, 
the current annual costs to travellers, mainly in the form of wasted time but also 
in the form of extra consumption of gasoline and vehicle wear and tear, have 
been estimated to run as high as $40 billion. The annual cost of congestion to 
shippers, in the form of higher inventories and more goods stuck en route, adds 
considerably to this figure.
13 
Even when roads are widened to keep up with demand, the expanded roads 
shortly fill to capacity. For example, the Montgomery County, Maryland, 
transportation director pressed the Maryland state government to widen its 
Interstate 270 six years ahead of schedule to accommodate growing traffic. 
Maryland responded with $200 million to widen more than a dozen miles of  
I-270, up to 12 lanes in some stretches. But less than eight years after the project 
was finished, county officials describe the highway as ‘a rolling parking lot’.
14 
The US road system represents the nation’s largest civilian public investment. 
None the less, congestion appears to have become an intractable problem 
                                                                                                                                    
13Estimates of the costs of automobile congestion to travellers are produced by the Texas Transportation 
Institute at Texas A&M University. 
14This is partly an outcome of Downs’s (1962) law: on urban commuter expressways, peak-hour traffic 
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because public expenditures to expand urban road capacity cannot keep up with 
growing automobile travel. 
IV. ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES OF CURRENT URBAN 
TRANSPORT POLICY 
The traditional theoretical justification for government management and 
operation of transit is that a private transit market would result in destructive 
competition.
15 Public transit agencies could maximise social net benefits by 
setting travellers’ fares equal to the marginal cost of their trips and providing 
service, such as frequency and route coverage, where additional benefits to 
travellers equal the additional costs.
16 Government ownership and management 
of roads is justified on the grounds that roads are (for the most part) public goods 
that require enormous investments. Given congestion and road surface wear, the 
public highway authority could maximise social net benefits by charging users 
for the particular costs they incur and by making investments where marginal 
benefits equal marginal costs. 
TABLE 2 
Effects of Efficient Urban Transportation Pricing and Services in the US 
Billions of 1998 dollars 






Efficient pricing only      
Auto, bus and rail total  –16.0  23.9  7.9 
Auto toll  –8.2  12.0  3.8 
Bus –4.3  7.0  2.6 
Rail –2.4  2.8  0.4 
Efficient pricing and optimal service frequency      
Auto, bus and rail total  –16.2  29.3  13.0 
Bus –4.3  11.7  7.3 
Rail –2.8  4.3  1.6 
Source: Winston and Shirley, 1998. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
15Government intervention has also been justified on the grounds of ‘Hotelling’ bunching — competing transit 
companies would arrive at bus stops or rail stations at the same time. Bunching, however, occurs quite 
frequently in most public transit systems. 
16If transit companies operate where there are increasing returns to scale, this first-best policy will require some 
subsidy because marginal costs are below average costs. If no subsidies are available (an unlikely situation in 
public transit), then Ramsey pricing represents the efficient second-best policy where the percentage mark-up 
of fares above marginal cost is inversely related to travellers’ demand elasticities subject to a break-even 
constraint. Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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Large public transit deficits, low transit load factors and severe highway 
congestion, however, suggest that the US public sector is not setting urban 
transportation prices and service to maximise net benefits. Winston and Shirley 
(1998) explore this matter empirically by estimating the net benefits from two 
policies: replacing current transit prices and service frequency with marginal 
cost transit fares and optimal service frequency; and setting marginal cost 
automobile congestion tolls.
17 (The tolls, which can be assessed with current 
technology that does not disrupt motorists’ journeys or invade their privacy, 
account for travellers’ value of time and vary with the level of congestion 
throughout the day.) Policy simulations are based on an equilibrium model of 
urban transportation pricing and service where urban commuters choose among 
alternative modes (auto, bus, rail, taxi or car pool) and departure times. The 
effects of the pricing and service policies on consumer benefits and government 
balances are shown in Table 2.
18 
The net benefits from implementing only the pricing components of this 
policy total nearly $8 billion a year. Because optimal pricing means much higher 
fares and tolls, travellers themselves lose $16 billion.
19 But these private losses 
are more than offset by the reduced public transit deficits and accumulated toll 
revenues that bring the urban transportation budget into balance. It is, of course, 
questionable whether the average citizen will see benefits in policies that 
increase his or her costs, even as they lower public deficits. But voters are 
demonstrably inclined to support elected officials who reduce government 
spending (Peltzman, 1992; Winston and Crandall, 1994), so travellers wearing 
their hats as taxpayers would likely vote for their enlightened self-interest at the 
ballot box. In fact, the benefits noted in Table 2 are understated because they do 
not account for the cost of raising public funds (excess burden) to cover the 
transit deficit. 
Some policymakers and analysts have tried to justify transit subsidies on 
second-best efficiency grounds because auto travel is implicitly subsidised — 
that is, travellers’ costs of using their automobiles do not include the costs of 
congestion, pollution and the like. But the findings show that overall urban 
transportation efficiency would improve if any mode’s prices were aligned with 
its marginal costs. Current transit fares are so out of line with costs that marginal 
cost pricing would reduce economic waste, even if the price of using auto travel 
remained unchanged. By the same token, raising the cost of driving to account 
                                                                                                                                    
17Optimal service frequency is the level of bus and rail frequency that maximises net benefits, which are 
composed of the changes in travellers’ benefits, congestion toll revenues, bus revenues and costs, and rail 
revenues and costs. 
18Consumer benefits are measured by compensating variations that are based on the joint choice model of mode 
and departure time. Changes in government balances are based on changes in bus revenues and costs, rail 
revenues and costs, and toll revenues. 
19Congestion pricing provides benefits to peak-period auto travellers in the form of shorter travel time. The 
losses to travellers are net of these benefits. Fiscal Studies 
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for congestion without raising mass transit fares would also increase overall 
urban transportation efficiency. 
Net benefits to society would climb to $13 billion a year if service frequency 
as well as prices were adjusted to maximise net benefits. Current transit 
frequency is excessive because of low ridership and oversized vehicles. Thus 
cutting frequency generates benefits because public deficits are reduced by more 
than the value of service lost to urban travellers. 
Government’s failure to set efficient prices and service frequency for bus and 
rail transit and set optimal tolls for auto travel has generated large social costs, 
but these are only part of the allocative inefficiencies created by government 
involvement in urban transportation. Inefficiencies have also arisen because 
transit’s service offerings are not optimised in other areas such as route coverage 
and because highway charges do not reflect the road damage caused by trucks.
20 
Public authorities have also failed to keep down the cost of urban transit 
service. The large share of empty bus and rail seats is one indication that costs 
are too high.
21 This excess capacity also prevents transit from realising its 
competitive advantage over auto. Transit’s average operating costs per seat-mile 
are lower than auto’s, but its empty seats drive its operating costs per passenger-
mile above auto’s (Winston and Shirley, 1998). Other indications of transit 
inefficiency include excessive wages (the typical Washington, DC, Metrobus 
driver, for example, gets paid twice as much as drivers for the handful of private 
bus companies in the DC area) and declining productivity. Lave (1991) estimates 
that transit productivity has fallen 40 per cent since the public take-over in the 
mid-1960s. 
Travel on urban thoroughfares is also not produced at minimum cost. Roth 
(1996) argues that highways make inefficient use of their capacity and actually 
run a substantial deficit when depreciation of highway capital is taken into 
account. Small, Winston and Evans (1989) found that highway pavement is 
generally too thin, which raises maintenance costs. Public management of 
construction projects also raises costs because bureaucratic rules prevent the 
government from using the latest technologies, causing some investments to 
need upgrading shortly after completion. Project managers also specify detailed 
regulations that force contractors to adhere to the letter of the contract instead of 
                                                                                                                                    
20Road damage depends on a truck’s weight per axle (the more axles a truck has for a given load, the less road 
damage) and should be covered by a user charge per mile based on axle weight. Small, Winston and Evans 
(1989) estimate that the efficiency improvements from replacing the gas tax, which is currently used to charge 
trucks for highway use, with an axle-weight tax amount to $8 billion (1996 dollars), using a GDP inflator. With 
respect to efficient pricing of other transport externalities, Winston and Shirley (1998) find there would be 
small net benefits from charging travellers for the cost of accidents and pollution. 
21Transit’s inherent operations — gradually increasing ridership in the primary commuting direction and 
consistently low ridership for the reverse commute — suggest that even an efficient transit system is unlikely to 
achieve average load factors that exceed 50 per cent. But public transit’s average load factor is far below that 
figure and has been declining for some time. It was 22 per cent in 1975, 18 per cent in 1985 and 16 per cent in 
1995. Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
413 
seeking higher-quality, efficient alternatives. Finally, highway labour costs have 
been elevated by the Davis–Bacon Act, which requires that prevailing union 
wages must be paid on all federal construction contracts. 
The legislative process also encourages waste. At the federal level, 
transportation bills are loaded with demonstration or ‘pork barrel’ projects to 
ensure passage (T21 is larded with some $9  billion of pork). A notorious 
example is the stretch of I-99 connecting Wolfsburg and Bald Eagle, 
Pennsylvania. Dubbed the Bud Shuster highway after the influential local 
congressman, the road carries less traffic in a year than the Washington, DC, 
Capital Beltway carries in three days. None the less, Shuster supports extending 
it to the tune of $400 million. 
For their part, state and city officials tend to prefer urban transportation 
projects that entail a large federal contribution over those that could yield greater 
social benefits. In addition, federal legislation in 1991 may have encouraged 
local officials to understate the potential costs of their projects by requiring that 
regions craft transportation programmes that included only those road and transit 
projects that had lined up funding. When the true, as opposed to wishful, costs of 
these projects have become apparent, officials have delayed other projects. 
Until analysts better understand how both mass transit and auto can benefit 
travellers, it is premature to say whether a more efficient urban transportation 
system would shift travellers from mass transit to auto, or vice versa. Given the 
inescapable reality that the delivery of urban transportation by the public sector 
is creating substantial allocative and technical inefficiencies, researchers should 
consider how each mode’s operations would improve in a privatised 
environment. Unfortunately, many analysts are preoccupied with how mode 
shares would change if policymakers followed their advice on how to design a 
‘better’ public urban transportation system. What they fail to recognise is that 
current inefficiencies in the public sector are not simply an historical accident 
that can and will be easily corrected, but rather the predictable result of powerful 
political forces that are unlikely to change. 
V. POLITICAL FORCES IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION 
It is no secret that policymakers — appropriately — respond more to political 
forces than to market forces. Thus the subsidies that have become a fixture in 
urban transit largely accrue to powerful interests — higher wages to labour, 
including managers, operators and station agents, and higher profits to suppliers 
of transit capital. But a portion does go to keeping fares below cost and 
expanding service beyond what could be supported without subsidies. Winston 
and Shirley (1998) link much of transit’s pricing and service inefficiencies with 
patrons’ political influence: upper-middle-income rail riders benefit from more 
frequent service and route coverage, lower- and middle-income bus riders get 
more frequent service, and so on. Indeed, the recent debate about where to put Fiscal Studies 
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the Red Line and new rapid bus lines in Los Angeles was more about the 
strength of homeowner groups and less about where the lines best integrate with 
the city.
22 
Transit inefficiencies might be more easily overlooked if they redistributed 
income from the well-to-do to the poor. But with the average annual household 
income of bus commuters approaching $40,000, with the average annual 
household income of rail commuters exceeding $50,000 and with train operators 
and station agents for the BART system in San Francisco, for example, being 
paid more than $40,000 a year, the poor are hardly transit’s greatest 
beneficiaries.
23 
Highway spending also responds to strong interest groups, ‘pork barrel’ 
projects being an obvious example.
24 To maintain political support for a national 
highway system, the allocation of funds for highway repairs appears to be based 
on formulas that are biased in favour of (rural) states with relatively low 
highway use (Johnson and Libecap, 2000). In some cases, highway construction 
has been slowed because neighbourhoods (in Boston and San Francisco, for 
example) resist demolitions for expressways that will mostly serve suburban 
commuting to downtown. 
Efforts to implement congestion pricing on public highways have also been 
held hostage by politics. For example, a dispute between California public 
agencies and the state legislature over the redistribution of toll revenues 
prevented a congressionally authorised congestion toll experiment from being 
implemented on the San Francisco Bay Bridge (Shmanske, 1996). Given the 
wasteful spending of transportation funds, perhaps a silver lining in the nation’s 
failure to introduce congestion pricing is that the ‘pot of gold’ represented by 
congestion toll revenues has not materialised in the public sector. 
A fundamental question is how much travellers are willing to pay to save 
travel time by having road authorities set congestion tolls on highways. Calfee 
and Winston (1998) and Calfee, Winston and Stempski (forthcoming) suggest 
that automobile travellers’ willingness to pay is much lower than once thought 
and that most travellers do not appear to value travel time savings enough to 
benefit substantially from optimal tolls. But it is clear in certain situations that 
auto travellers would be willing to pay considerable sums to travel faster. For 
example, a solo driver who was fined $50 for using a car-pool lane on a freeway 
                                                                                                                                    
22Glenn Gritzner and Katherine Perez, ‘Something is missing in this Red Line picture’, Los Angeles Times, 10 
July 2000, p. 1 metro. 
23Winston and Shirley (1998) summarise evidence concluding that public transit programmes such as reverse 
commuting, which are designed to give low-income people greater access to suburban jobs, have not met with 
much success. 
24Evans (1994) shows that the inclusion of highway demonstration projects is important to securing passage of 
legislation authorising the nation’s highway and transit programmes. Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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in the Washington, DC, area viewed the fine as ‘not a lot of money to pay to get 
to work an hour earlier’.
25 
Policymakers’ preferred method of combating congestion has been to build 
more roads. Less politically expedient policies such as charging motorists 
efficiently for road use find less favour.
26 Car-pool lanes have been tried in some 
urban areas, but it is not clear whether these increase or decrease congestion. As 
funds for new roads are inevitably outstripped by demand and additions to 
existing roads fill up quickly with traffic, many urban officials are spending 
hundreds of thousands of dollars on commissions to ‘study’ ways to reduce 
congestion. But at least one commission concluded that political obstacles seem 
to put any strategy out of reach.
27 
US policymakers at all levels of government have shaped an urban 
transportation system that benefits specific travellers and suppliers, but whose 
welfare costs are borne by all taxpayers. As long as transit is provided by the 
public sector, it is hard to see how the political forces that contribute to its 
current allocative and technical inefficiencies could be overcome. Efforts to 
improve the efficiency of public roads are also hamstrung by politics. 
Apparently, the federal government sees no reason to change matters because the 
T21 legislation indicates there will be no break with past transit or highway 
policy. Privatisation is therefore starting to be seen in a different light and is 
slowly attracting interest among transportation analysts as the only realistic hope 
for paring the huge inefficiencies that have developed in urban transportation 
under public management. 
VI. BUILDING THE CASE FOR PRIVATISATION 
Privatisation and deregulation could transform the US urban transportation 
system in the same way that deregulation has transformed US intercity transport. 
Starting in the mid-1970s, deregulation of the railroad, trucking and airline 
industries gave each the incentive and ability to become more efficient, 
innovative and responsive to customers, generating more than $50  billion in 
annual net benefits to consumers (Winston, 1998). Given deregulation’s 
bipartisan political support, it is puzzling that privatisation conjures up 
ideological connotations among some policymakers instead of hope that it, 
combined with deregulation, can solve government failures. In fact, there is 
ample evidence that market forces in urban transit could accomplish a great deal 
                                                                                                                                    
25Alan Sipress and Josh White, ‘Guilty, but feeling guilt-free’, Washington Post, 16 July 2000, p. A1. 
26Similarly, policymakers have only addressed road damage by repairing roads. They have not pursued efficient 
road wear taxes that would encourage truckers to shift to trucks that do less damage to the roads. 
27Peter Behr, ‘Area leaders hit traffic roadblock: political obstacles hamper solutions to driving woes’, 
Washington Post, 28 September 1997, p. A1. Fiscal Studies 
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of what public officials have been unable or unwilling to do. A conceptual case 
for privatising roads can be made, but it needs empirical analysis. 
1. Urban Transit 
It is true that the federal government got involved in urban transit during the 
1960s because private transit failed. But Pashigian (1976) and Hilton (1985) 
provide evidence that private bus operations failed because they were weakened 
by government regulation. Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez (1981) point out that 
federal policy almost made it mandatory for cities to acquire their private transit 
companies instead of allowing them to raise fares to become more profitable. In 
response to those who claim that public transit’s vehicle size and scale 
economies imply competition is unworkable in a private market, Walters (1982) 
argues that the extent of these economies indicates that public transit’s 
operations are plagued by excess capacity. Such inefficiencies could be 
substantially eliminated in a private market where operators have the incentive 
and ability to improve their operations. 
Just how would privatisation and deregulation reduce transit pricing and 
service inefficiencies? Winston and Shirley (1998) construct a model in which 
existing bus and rail companies are forced to compete with each other as well as 
automobiles and set prices and service frequency to maximise profits. They find 
that the effects of such competition are remarkably similar to the effects of 
marginal cost transit pricing and optimal service frequency. Society’s gains from 
eliminating transit deficits — private carriers would earn profits — would 
substantially exceed travellers’ losses from higher fares and reduced service. 
These findings, however, greatly overstate the potential losses to travellers 
because they do not reflect the improvements in operations, marketing and 
service that could be achieved by private transit and the impact that new entrants 
would have on fares and service. 
Deregulation of intercity transportation revealed that regulation had 
substantially raised carriers’ costs and inhibited marketing and service 
innovations (Winston, 1998; Morrison and Winston, 1999). Given the freedom 
and incentive to use the latest technologies to improve routeing, scheduling and 
vehicle design, private transit companies could substantially raise load factors 
and improve productivity. Greater competition would put downward pressure on 
labour and capital costs. Such influences drove deregulated railroads’, airlines’ 
and truckers’ real operating costs more than a third lower than they had been 
under regulation. It is likely that transit operating costs would decline similarly if 
bus and rail companies were privatised.
28 
                                                                                                                                    
28Indianapolis is one of the few US cities that has privatised its transit system. Karlaftis and McCarthy (1999) 
estimate that, although the system is producing more vehicle-miles and passenger-miles, its operating costs 
have declined 2.5 per cent annually since privatisation. These savings are primarily efficiency gains, not 
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Under deregulation, airlines accelerated development of hub-and-spoke route 
structures to increase flight frequencies, railroads introduced double-stack trains 
and made greater use of intermodal (truck–rail) systems to improve service 
times, and truckers developed high-service megacarriers. Railroads and truckers 
also contracted with shippers for special services, such as expedited pick-up and 
delivery to facilitate just-in-time inventory policies. Similar service innovations 
by privatised bus and rail transit companies would also benefit travellers. 
Possibilities include new non-stop express van and bus services, specialised 
scheduled and non-scheduled van services, and door-to-door services.
29 Private 
bus and rail companies might also find it profitable to offer premium higher-fare 
service with seat and schedule guarantees. Transit service innovations could 
generate improvements in land use too, something rarely achieved by public 
transit (Pickrell, 1999). 
These innovations go beyond what John R. Meyer characterises as ‘transit’s 
streetcar mentality’ — scheduled stops by large buses or rail cars along a fixed 
route under all travel conditions. Transit operators, for example, might improve 
efficiency and service to travellers by providing looped express bus operations 
— turning some buses short instead of running all buses the full length of the 
route — and running minibus operations on the outer (lower-density) parts of the 
route (see Kerin (1990)). Indeed, as I discuss later, intensive minibus operations 
have been a beneficial outcome of British bus privatisation. 
The deregulation experience has also shown that new market entrants, such as 
Southwest Airlines, often become the most efficient firms in a deregulated 
industry. In the transit industry, privatisation could lead to intense competition 
supplied by paratransit operations, such as jitneys, and other low-cost operations, 
such as minibuses. Competition among these new entrants and conventional bus, 
rail, taxi and auto modes would ensure that cost reductions would become fare 
reductions.
30 
Unlike airlines and trucks, railroads were deregulated because of their poor 
financial performance under regulation. It was expected that, in pursuit of greater 
profitability, the deregulated railroad industry would substantially reduce its 
operations, raise rates on much of its bulk freight and cede a lot of manufactured 
freight to truck. Railroads have indeed pruned their systems, but they have also 
become more efficient and responsive to customers — offering lower (contract) 
rates and better service. Thus instead of losing market share, deregulated 
railroads are actually carrying more freight, regaining market share and 
increasing their earnings. Depending on the behaviour of new entrants and what 
                                                                                                                                    
29See, for example, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (1998). 
30It would be desirable to deregulate taxis as part of a broader strategy to stimulate competition in urban 
transport. No longer enjoying a secure niche between the private car and the city bus or rail service, taxis would 
be forced, for example, to compete with vans that operate like taxis and offer links with rail and bus operations. 
The increased competition and co-ordination in the new urban transit system should lower taxi fares, improve 
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is done with the established transit authorities, there are numerous possibilities 
for how a privatised transit industry would supply peak and off-peak service.
31 
None the less, the railroads’ experience suggests that an efficient transformation 
of the transit industry’s operations, technology, pricing and service could 
increase transit use and relieve taxpayers of subsidising transit’s operations. 
From a political perspective, deregulation succeeded because its benefits did 
not accrue to the rich at the expense of the poor. To be sure, some travellers and 
shippers benefited more than others, but the distribution of benefits generally 
had a rational economic basis. Public transit authorities have not aggressively 
pursued, let alone achieved, laudable social goals such as improving the urban 
mobility of the poor (Winston and Shirley, 1998). Thus a private system would 
not threaten to undermine any socially desirable income transfers. In fact, a 
private system may benefit low-income travellers because carriers would have 
the financial incentive and ability to develop a market for such customers. For 
example, Queens Van Plan, a private company, developed a highly valued and 
profitable service for low- to middle-income minority workers in New York’s 
Queens and Nassau counties, who were largely neglected by public transit.
32 
2. Roads 
Public highways are characterised by pricing and design inefficiencies, inflated 
labour costs and expenditures on new construction and repair, and wasteful 
projects. Public authorities’ delays in adopting technological innovations that 
could substantially improve the speed and safety of highway travel may also 
emerge as a large social cost. 
At this point, the appeal of highway privatisation in US cities and intercity 
stretches is conceptual. Empirical evidence on its potential effects is not yet 
available. Thus I believe it is premature to recommend privatising US highways, 
but it is worth thinking about how market forces could reduce highway 
inefficiencies. 
Let us begin with pricing. The conventional criticism of current road pricing 
is that it does not account for congestion. I have presented estimates of the 
benefits of congestion pricing in the US based on an average value of travellers’ 
willingness to pay to save travel time. However, travellers differ — sometimes 
greatly — in how much they are willing to pay for transport capacity. For 
example, in airline travel, some business travellers are willing to pay the large 
costs that airlines incur for making seats available to them when they travel at 
the last moment. At the other extreme, some pleasure travellers make an effort to 
                                                                                                                                    
31One strategy transit companies might pursue is to set capacity for off-peak periods and rely on part-time 
labour to develop peak capacity with extra scheduling and looping. Competition from private jitneys and other 
services with scheduled bus operations could be gradually introduced following the property rights approach 
developed by Klein, Moore and Reja (1997). 
32Hector Ricketts, ‘Roadblocks made just for vans’, New York Times, 22 November 1997, p. A15. Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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get low fares by planning their trips far in advance and being flexible about 
which day of the week they can travel. Other air travellers have preferences and 
constraints that fall between these extremes, and their fares are set accordingly. 
Thus by offering a range of fares and associated travel restrictions, the 
deregulated airline industry has greatly improved the use of its aircraft capacity 
and benefited travellers. 
Some highway commuters are willing to pay a great deal to get to work much 
faster on a particular day, while others are not willing to pay much to speed up 
their trip. Highway capacity could be used more efficiently if motorists were 
offered a range of prices and service levels (for example, travellers could choose 
among high-priced lanes with little congestion and lower-priced lanes with more 
congestion). 
In fact, a few US highways have made a start in this direction by introducing 
value pricing. An example is the high-occupancy-toll (HOT) lanes on I-15 near 
San Diego, where solo drivers pay a toll to use less-congested car-pool lanes. By 
varying over the day, the toll more accurately reflects the value the road provides 
over alternate routes. But as pointed out by Small (2000), second-best pricing 
distortions may arise in highway travel because one or a few lanes are tolled but 
free alternate lanes and routes are close at hand. The efficient (first-best) policy 
would be to price all lanes (and alternate highways) in accordance with traffic 
conditions and travellers’ willingness to pay to save travel time. 
Could competition among highways develop and produce efficient tolls? New 
Zealand is considering a bold first step, called commercialisation, where the 
government turns its roads over to commercial road companies, which would be 
expected to charge for their use and earn a return on capital while being 
regulated as public utilities. Such a policy would be problematic in the US, 
where government regulation of public utilities is renowned for creating 
inefficiencies. Others have suggested that the US government franchise 
highways to private companies, although the devil would still be in the operating 
and financial constraints that the government placed on franchised companies 
and whether competition could evolve given these constraints. 
Intercity deregulation offers a potentially useful analogy for solving this 
problem. Deregulated carriers have had to compete against each other, and in a 
certain sense against consumer ‘organisations’. For example, railroads set most 
of their rates through contract negotiations with shippers. Among other factors, 
rates are affected by a shipper’s traffic volume and competitive options. Shippers 
can improve their bargaining position by increasing their traffic volume as part 
of a group of firms that negotiates rates and by playing off one railroad against 
potential sources of competition. Such sources include other railroads in the 
market, other railroads reasonably close to the shipper, plants that compete with 
the shipper’s plant in the product market, alternative origins from which the 
receiver could use alternative railroads to receive a product, alternative modes 
such as truck and barge, and so on. By enhancing their bargaining power, Fiscal Studies 
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shippers can fully realise the benefits of rail-freight competition. Similarly, the 
benefits of airline competition are enhanced when travellers negotiate as a group 
to get lower fares or encourage a new entrant to provide service when they are 
dissatisfied with incumbent carriers. 
Could highway users help road competition develop by organising as 
bargaining units that negotiate prices and service? Suppose the government 
distributes roads to commercial companies, as in commercialisation, but aims to 
allocate potentially competitive intercity stretches (for example, California’s 
Highway 101 and Interstate Route 5) and urban freeways and arterials to 
different companies. As in the railroad industry, a ‘contract equilibrium’ could 
develop where private companies negotiate prices (long-term contracts) with 
private organisations representing motorists, truckers, railroads, private transit 
companies and public sector transport. Public and private users en masse would 
therefore be able to bring competitive discipline on prices. 
What would these prices look like? Customer groups would likely prefer a 
range of prices and levels of service. For example, Federal Express and other 
time-sensitive companies would want a lane (or even separate roads) to be 
available at a premium price, and time-sensitive automobile travellers would 
probably be willing to pay high tolls for travel on a less congested lane. It would 
take time for private road companies to explore various services that users were 
willing to pay for and for users’ preferences to crystallise. But after that 
transition, the benefits could be large. Firms, and ultimately consumers, and 
households would gain from travel time savings. Out-of-pocket highway travel 
expenses would increase, especially for those who desire premium uncongested 
service, but price increases would be mitigated by, and taxpayers, in general, 
would benefit from, the lower cost of building, maintaining and operating 
highways. 
Profit-seeking private road companies would have strong incentives to shed 
the inefficiencies developed over decades in the public sector. Cost-cutting 
measures would include using axle-weight truck taxes to charge for road 
damage, building stronger roads, placing much more control over construction 
and repair expenditures, reducing wages and managerial waste, and eliminating 
politically motivated projects. 
Private road companies could improve the speed and safety of urban (and 
intercity) highway travel by implementing an intelligent transportation system 
(ITS). Such a system could include centrally controlled traffic signals, electronic 
toll collection, message signs about traffic conditions, and traffic control centres 
that, as needed, dispatch emergency vehicles, adjust signal timing and relay 
important road information to motorists. Under government management, the 
high-tech promises of this system could be compromised. One only has to think 
of the Federal Aviation Administration’s management of air traffic control to Government Failure in Urban Transportation 
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understand how the US government would raise the cost and slow the 
implementation of ITS.
33 
The possibility of turning US roads over to private companies will seem less 
far-fetched as the inefficiencies caused by the public sector increase and become 
more widely known. The best way to implement this experiment and estimates of 
its economic effects await further research.
34 
VII. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH URBAN TRANSPORT 
PRIVATISATION 
Urban transport in the UK suffers from many of the same economic problems. 
Prices for all modes fall short of efficient prices (Peirson and Vickerman, 1998), 
urban bus and rail transit require large subsidies, road congestion is severe, and 
transit and highway infrastructure is in poor condition but funds are not available 
to finance required investments. Unlike the US, however, the UK has begun to 
address some of these problems by privatising and deregulating part of its urban 
transport system. 
The Transport Acts of 1980 and 1985 largely privatised and deregulated the 
bus industry in the UK, with the exception of London and Northern Ireland. 
Although buses operating within London were not deregulated, individual routes 
were put out for competitive tender. Under the 1985 Act, public or private bus 
companies could offer virtually any bus service they deemed profitable by giving 
local authorities 42 days’ (6 weeks’) notice. The 70 subsidiaries of the National 
Bus Company — a nationalised entity — were sold and the other publicly 
managed bus companies that had dominated local bus service were reorganised 
as separate for-profit corporations. Many of these companies were subsequently 
sold to the private sector, while those that remained public could no longer 
receive direct government subsidies. Local authorities could supplement 
commercial routes by subsidising additional services that they felt were justified 
by social concerns, but these services had to be secured through competitive 
bidding. 
The privatised UK bus industry has consolidated to a great extent and is 
currently dominated by large bus companies such as Stagecoach. None the less, 
the economic effects of the Transport Acts have been broadly consistent with the 
predictions of bus privatisation and deregulation in the US (Winston and Shirley, 
1998). White (1997) found that improvements in labour productivity, lower 
wages and lower fuel and maintenance costs for minibuses — a major service 
                                                                                                                                    
33Air traffic control has been criticised for decades for cost overruns and delays in introducing new technology 
that would make air travel safer and faster. Most recently, it has been under the gun for failing to introduce 
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology that could enable air carriers to choose speedier flight paths and 
to take off and land more quickly. 
34Privatisation of roads could (and probably should) be introduced sequentially, beginning with bridges and 
bottleneck thoroughfares, and moving to entire highways. Fiscal Studies 
422 
innovation — reduced real bus operating costs. Kennedy (1995) found that 
competitive tendering for bus routes in London also lowered operating costs. As 
costs have fallen and fares have risen, the government has reduced bus subsidies 
from £237 million in 1985 to £117 million in 1998. Bus ridership has declined 
roughly a quarter, but in some areas of the country ridership has increased in 
response to intensive minibus operations.
35 Just three years after privatisation, 
minibuses providing local service outside of London have grown from a few 
hundred to nearly 7,000 (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1993). Minibuses operate at 
higher average speeds and offer greater frequencies than conventional buses, and 
their smaller sizes and manœuvrability allow some operators to offer ‘hail-and-
ride’ service in which the minibus will stop at any point on the route to pick up 
and discharge passengers. White, Turner and Mbara (1992) estimate that 
travellers have benefited substantially from minibus services that have expanded 
into suburban areas. 
The UK has not privatised inner-city rail operations, but in March 1998, 
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott announced that the London Transport 
Group (now London Underground Limited) will award three private-sector 
contracts to maintain and modernise the London Underground. Successful 
bidders will be responsible for track, signals and stations, while trains will 
continue to operate within the public sector. The reform is expected to reduce 
rail infrastructure costs and the Underground’s annual subsidy (now some 
£100 million). The economic effects of this policy will also depend on the rental 
charges that the public authority must pay the private companies to use the 
renewed facilities. 
The UK has taken no steps to privatise roads, but in 1998 the government 
published Breaking the Logjam,
36 which proposed legislation to empower local 
authorities to ‘charge drivers for using particular roads or roads in a specified 
area, and to levy a charge on workplace parking’. Although the object is to 
reduce congestion or traffic growth, Newbery and Santos (1999) point out that 
there has been little discussion of the principles that should guide these road 
charges. It appears that local authorities are primarily being encouraged to use 
them to help finance transport or land-use projects — a purpose that caused the 
California state legislature to cancel one of the few congestion pricing 
demonstration projects ever proposed in the US.
37 
Budgetary pressures, rather than concern with allocative and technical 
inefficiencies created by the public sector, are motivating the UK’s privatisation 
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attributing all of the recent decline in ridership to privatisation. 
36Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998. 
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efforts in urban bus operations and rail infrastructure. From a US perspective, 
the UK experience is encouraging because it demonstrates that transit 
privatisation and deregulation can reduce costs and spur innovative services such 
as minibuses.
38 On the other hand, the US is not especially concerned with 
transit deficits, as indicated by the T21 legislation, which increases federal 
spending for transit (and highways). Thus it is not clear what will induce the US 
to pursue privatisation. 
VIII. FINAL COMMENTS 
Intercity deregulation in the US became politically attractive in the 1970s when 
the political benefits to policymakers from working in harness with carriers and 
labour were overwhelmed by the potential political gains from reducing 
inflation. When policymakers were ready to act, academic research was available 
to guide their understanding of the likely effects of deregulation. 
Similarly, the probability of privatising urban transport in the US will 
increase if the prospect of major political gain becomes clear. Unfortunately, it 
won’t in the near future because recent successes in eliminating budget deficits 
at all governmental levels have eased pressure to cut wasteful spending on urban 
transportation. None the less, researchers should continue to explore the effects 
of privatisation and provide guidance for how cities can conduct privatisation 
experiments. There is no escaping the evidence that the US government’s 
activity in this area is marked by failure. Research should be available when the 
promise of political gains beckons policymakers to acknowledge this failure. 
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